Anderson v President of the Parole Board Queensland [2025] QSC 123

Summary 

In Anderson v President of the Parole Board Queensland [2025] QSC 123 (30 May 2025), Justice Treston in the Supreme Court of Queensland determined that the President of the Queensland Parole Board (President) committed an error of law by failing to consider an applicant’s human rights when deciding the length of the applicant’s ‘restricted prisoner declaration’. Specifically, the President failed to consider the applicant’s right to dignity and humane treatment while deprived of liberty under the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (CSA) and the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (HRA).   

Facts  

The applicant, Rodney George Anderson, was convicted of murder in October 1997 and sentenced to life imprisonment. In November 2000, the applicant murdered a fellow person in prison. The applicant then became eligible for parole in November 2020.  

However, the President made a ‘restricted prisoner declaration’ under section 175E of the CSA which prevented the applicant from applying for parole for a further period of 8.5 years. By that time, the applicant will be 78 years of age.  

The applicant did not contest the fact of declaration but rather sought judicial review as to the length of declaration. This was advanced on two main grounds.  

By the first ground, the applicant argued the respondent made an error of law in determining the duration of the declaration by failing to have regard to the applicant’s human rights when considering the public interest under the CSA.  

By the second ground, the applicant argued the respondent failed to give proper consideration, as required by section 58(1)(b) of the HRA, to the applicant’s relevant human rights in making the decision. For example, the right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty under section 30(1) of the HRA.  

A related third ground alleged by the applicant was that the respondent failed to demonstrate the respondent’s decision was compatible with the applicant’s human rights, as also required by section 58(1)(a) of the HRA.   

Decision  

Ground One 

Justice Treston found that sections 175H and 175I of the CSA require human rights, such as the right to dignity when deprived of liberty, to be considered, particularly when deciding the length of the declaration. Despite the sections not explicitly requiring the President to do so, Her Honour found the obligation arises in light of the subject matter, scope and purpose of the particular power being exercised by the respondent.  

Her Honour reasoned that what is considered the “public interest” must not be confined to external factors such as the severity of the offences and the risks posed to the community due to potential recidivism. Given that decisions like these can have “devastating consequences”, consideration of the public interest demands the aforementioned factors be weighed against the interests of the affected person in prison. Consequently, such deliberations necessitate a consideration of human rights.  

Her Honour also provided some insight as to how the construction and operation of these sections necessitate consideration of the applicant’s human rights.  

First, Justice Treston cited the language of section 175I(4)(a), noting that the provision states: “[i]n deciding the term of the declaration” (emphasis in original) the president must “be satisfied the term is in the public interest”. Her Honour noted that the President must then have regard to the matters in section 175H(2) (per section 175I(4)(b)) which, in order to avoid mere repetition of section 175I(4)(b), meant that section 175I(4)(a) must be broader than the matters to which the President must have regard in s 175I(4)(b).  

Her Honour noted that this construction aligns with section 48 of the HRA, which requires statutory provisions to be interpreted consistently with human rights where possible.  

Consequently, Justice Treston found that the President made an error of law in failing to genuinely consider the effect of the duration of the declaration, as well as its impact on the applicant particularly in light of his medical conditions.  

Ground Two  

Although the second ground was unnecessary to decide given the applicant had succeeded on the first, Justice Treston nevertheless went on to explain why this ground and the related third ground would still have been made out by the applicant.  

Despite acknowledging the respondent made brief mention of the applicant’s human rights, her Honour agreed with the applicant that a simple identification is insufficient for the purposes of section 58 of the HRA.  Her Honour noted that a “proper consideration”, as stipulated by the section, requires a “higher standard of consideration” than at common law. It involves a more deliberate “weighing up, or balancing, of human rights against countervailing public and private interests”. “Proper consideration” also requires considering whether the decision is compatible with the human rights under the HRA. On this basis, Treston J found that the term of the declaration was unlawful by reason of the respondent’s failure to consider human rights in determining the duration of the declaration as well as it’s compatibility with human rights, as required under section 58(1) of the HRA.  

 Commentary  

The case is a significant example of the role human rights law can play in parole matters, although its cross jurisdictional applicability in this regard is currently limited given that the Parole Board in Victoria is expressly excluded for the operation of Victoria’s equivalent human rights laws.  

Beyond this, the case demonstrates the increasing significance of human rights frameworks and obligations in informing administrative decisions. Whilst this ruling was concerned specifically with parole decisions regarding those whose liberty was being restricted (or further restricted), the principles underlying this judgment could have broader implications.  

In clarifying that the “public interest” test in the CSA cannot be interpreted narrowly to focus only on community safety or risk factors and instead must include the interests of the individual affected by the decision, the consideration of human rights becomes no longer peripheral but central to the assessment of what is in the public interest. Consequently, with respect to other administrative decisions contingent upon an assessment of what is in the public interest (not necessarily ones relating to those whose liberty is being restricted) human rights may become an important factor in such an assessment.  

Moreover, the ruling signifies to decision makers they must do more than merely acknowledge or ‘pay lip service’ to the existence of human rights. Instead, they must actively weight and balance these rights against other relevant interests when making administrative decisions that affect individuals. 

Last, the ruling serves as a warning to public authorities that a failure to comply with human rights obligations may result in their decisions being quashed. 

The full judgment can be found here. This case note was prepared by Claire Martin, solicitor at King & Wood Mallesons.